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"After all, if a policeman must know the Constitution,
then why not a planner?"
Mr. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego
FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT in Washington to the shores of
Hawaii, land use issues continue to boil and bubble across the
country. The taking issue' is upon us again, and plans converted
into laws in land use "revolutionary" states2 keep them at the
cutting edge of land use controls. These and other timely land use
developments (historic preservation, amortization of noncon-
forming uses and inclusionary zoning) are the main focus of this
article. Other "short takes" touch briefly upon selected recent
developments around the country in Section 1983 actions affecting
land use, referendum zoning, aesthetics and architectural control,
and water pollution/land use. For the most part, the developments
deal with cases, ordinances, and statutes from the 1980-81 period,
though occasionally other material is cited for background or
amplification of the issues raised in the most recent developments.
A. The Taking Issue Redux
A number of commentators3 have attempted to deal with the
troublesome issue raised by Justice Holmes in 1922 when he de-
1. Bosselman, Callies & Banta, The Taking Issue (cited in ch. 4, CEQ 1973)
(report prepared for Council on Environmental Quality).
2. Bosselman & Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Controls (cited in
ch. 1, CEQ 1972) (report prepared for Council on Environmental Quality);
Healy, Land Use and the States (The Conservation Foundation (1976)).
3. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (wherein the same
cided that a land use regulation, if it went too far, would amount to
a taking without compensation contrary to the Fifth Amendment.'
Recent developments make those discussions particularly relevant
this year.
1. The Supreme Court, Taking and
Ripeness, or, We Really Don't Want to
Decide This One, Do We?
A prime candidate for 1979-1980s judicial "laboring to bring forth
a mouse" award might well go to the Supreme Court in Agins v.
City of Tiburon.' There, it will no doubt be fondly remembered,
the Court managed to sidestep the only issue worth deciding:6 must
government actually pay compensation for a land use regulation
which is so onerous that it constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth
Amendment? The Court held that there hadn't been such a "reg-
ulatory taking," you see, so one couldn't really say.7
Then, this year, out of southernmost California, came San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,8 and the compensa-
tion issue was raised once more. The Supreme Court again ducked
the issue (this time by 5-4) on the barely plausible ground that the
state court decision appealed from was not final! The majority has
shrunk, however, and a united dissenting minority, per Justice
Brennan, gives more than a hint of how the Court might eventually
commentator adopts different views, illustrating the difficulty of drawing bound-
aries.) See also Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967);
Van Alstyne, Just Compensation for Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative
Modifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 491 (1969); The Taking Issue,
supra note 1.
4. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
6. We all know the California courts won't let landowners/developers build
anything! See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976); William C.
Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
7. 447 U.S. at 263. The author has long questioned the wisdom of "regulatory
taking" decisions which were first engrafted on the Constitution by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1927). See The Taking
Issue, supra note 1. As will appear below, Justice Brennan, writing for a four-justice dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co., appears bent upon hauling
Pennsylvania Coal Co. from the grave to which many state courts have been
attempting to consign it these past few years. A full discussion of the dissent and
its implications follows.
8. - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). For an exposition of the facts of the
case, its California history and the compensation issue generally, see Duerkson &
Mantell, Interim Damages: A Remedy in Land Use Cases?, 33 LAND USE LAW
AND ZONING DIG. 6 (April, 1981).
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decide the issue. It is a chilling premonition for local government
while a relief to landowners who have often gone wholly without
remedy in California and elsewhere when highly restrictive gov-
ernment regulations have virtually destroyed land values even
when the regulation itself is deemed and is held to be illegal.9
The facts are straightforward. San Diego Gas & Electric Com-
pany acquired a 412-acre site in 1966 for a nuclear power plant.
Approximately 214 acres lay in or near an estuary and were zoned
for industrial and agricultural use. In 1973, the city apparently
reclassified all the property as agricultural, adopted an open space
plan covering much of the site, and proposed a bond issue to
acquire it. Unfortunately, the city's citizens failed to approve the
bond issue. The company immediately sued the city and a number
of its officials, alleging that by reason of both the plan and the
agricultural zoning, there had been a taking of property without
compensation in violation of the United States and California
Constitutions. The company further alleged that the city always
refused to approve developments contrary to its plans even though
no such development plan had been presented to the city by the
company.
The trial court concluded that the city had indeed taken the
property and that just compensation was required. It subsequently
awarded the San Diego Gas & Electric Company over $3 million."0
The court of appeal affirmed on the grounds that the evidence
supported the company's contention that industrial use was the
only feasible use of the premises and that the city would have
denied such an application for development."
Within months, however, the California Supreme Court both
granted the city's petition for a hearing 2 and handed down its City
of Tiburon decision. That decision specifically denied a compensa-
tion remedy to one "deprived of substantially all beneficial use of
his land by a zoning regulation .. ."3 Only an action for man-
damus or declaratory relief was left him. San Diego was then
"retransferred" to the court of appeal which reversed itself and the
trial court on the compensation issue, but let the zoning and open
9. The outrageous practices of some local governments are touched uponbriefly in - U.S. at __ n.22, 101 S. Ct. at 1305 n.22 (Brennan J., dissenting).
10. - U.S. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
11. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Ct. App. 1978).12. Under California law, the California Supreme Court's grant of petition for
a hearing automatically vacates the appeals court decision "depriving it of all
effect." U.S. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
13. Id. at __ 101 S. Ct. at 1292.
space plan stand, noting that the electric company had not pre-
sented any development plans. The company then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
It was on these procedural facts that a bare majority of the Court
held that the appeal "must be dismissed because of the absence of a
final judgment."1" The Court focused on the part of the California
court of appeal's unpublished second decision which noted that the
appropriateness of mandamus or declaratory judgment was a mat-
ter of "disputed fact issues" which "can be dealt with anew should
[appellant] elect to retry the case."' 5 The Court stated:
[W]e read [this somewhat ambiguous phrase] as meaning that appellant is to
have an opportunity on remand to convince the trial court to resolve the
disputed issues in its favor.
The Court of Appeal has decided that monetary compensation is not an
appropriate remedy for any taking of appellant's property that may have
occurred, but it has not decided whether any other remedy is available because
it has not decided whether any taking in fact has occurred. Thus, however we
might rule with respect to the Court of Appeal's decision that appellant is not
entitled to a monetary remedy-and we are frank to say that the federal
constitutional aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly-further
proceedings are necessary to resolve the federal question whether there has
been a taking at all. The court's decision, therefore, is not final, and we are
without jurisdiction to review it.
Because section 1257 permits us to review only "[f]inal judgments or de-
crees" of a state court, the appeal must be, and is, dismissed.16
In dissent, Justice Brennan cogently argued for a four-member
minority that the Court's holding misread that of the court of
appeal:
In faithful compliance with the instructions of the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, the Court of Appeal held that the
city's exercise of its police power, however arbitrary or excessive, could not as a
matter of federal constitutional law constitute a "taking" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore that there was no "taking" without
just compensation in the instant case."
The dissent reached this conclusion through examination of the
California Supreme Court's decision in City of Tiburon:
The Court of Appeal's analysis was required by the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra. There the Court stated:
14. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1293.
15. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
16. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1294.
17. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Plaintiffs contend that the limitations on the use of their land imposed by
the ordinance constitute an unconstitutional "taking of [plaintiff's] prop-
erty without payment of just compensation" for which an action in inverse
condemnation will lie. Inherent in the contention is the argument that a local
entity's exercise of its police power which, in a given case, may exceed
constitutional limits is equivalent to the lawful taking of property by eminent
domain thereby necessitating the payment of compensation. We are unable
to accept this argument believing the preferable view to be that, while such
governmental action is invalid because of its excess, remedy by way of
damages in eminent domain is not thereby made available. 24 Cal. 3d, at
272, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 372, 598 P.2d, at 28 (brackets in original) (emphasis
added).
A landowner may not "elect to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby
transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which
compensation in eminent domain must be paid." Id., at 273, 157 Cal. Rptr., at
375, 598 P.2d, at 28 (emphasis added).18
As a result of City of Tiburon, the dissent determined:
The trial court has held expressly that the "actions of defendant City... taken
as a whole, constitute a taking of the portion of the plaintiff's property desig-
nated as open space without due process of law and just compensation within
the meaning of the California and United States constitutions." Joint App.
42-43 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeal reversed this holding and
concluded as a matter of law that no Fifth Amendment "taking" had occurred.
This is indistinguishable, then, from a dismissal of appellant's case for legal
insufficiency. In any such dismissal, factual questions are necessarily left unre-
solved. But when a litigant is denied relief as a matter of law, the judgment is
necessarily final within the meaning of section 1257.19
Justice Brennan then set out in detail how he and his three
dissenting brethren would address the merits. What made this
dissent particularly relevant was Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion (the "swing" vote), in which he stated: "If I were satisfied
that this appeal was from a 'final judgment or decree' . . . I would
have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the
dissenting opinion. . . ."' It is, therefore, just conceivable that we
have here a bare majority agreed on Justice Brennan's dissent for a
decision on the merits.
Government should be thankful for small favors; the dissent
would at least permit the government the option of rescission,
rather than permit the landowner to choose whether to seek full
compensation or mandamus/declaratory relief. Nevertheless, the
dissent-and probably Justice Rehnquist--clearly favor extending
the protection of the fifth amendment, for decades presumed to
18. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1298 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1294 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
apply only to eminent domain cases, to "regulatory takings" as
well. Whether or not City of Tiburon actually holds, as the dissent
claims, that a city's exercise of the police power, however arbitrary
and excessive, cannot as a matter of federal constitutional law
constitute a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
the dissent declares that such a holding "flatly contradicts clear
precedents of this Court."21 No matter that many of the cases cited
in which the Court found a taking are not land use regulation
cases, 2 since the dissent ultimately reaffirms its reliance on their
"source," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 in which Justice
Holmes wrote for the majority: "The general role at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking. 2
Dismissing "mere invalidation" as an insufficient remedy once a
taking by regulation has been found,' Justice Brennan, neverthe-
less, would hold that to require formal condemnation by the city
would go too far.36 He offered this solution:
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds a police
power regulation has effected a "taking," the government entity must pay just
compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first
effected the "taking," and ending on the date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation. Ordinary principles determining
the proper measure of just compensation, regularly applied in cases of perma-
nent and temporary "takings" involving formal condemnation proceedings,
occupations, and physical invasions, should provide guidance to the courts in
the award of compensation for a regulatory "taking." As a starting point, the
value of the property taken may be ascertained as of the date of the "taking."
• . . The government must inform the court of its intentions vis-A-vis the
regulation with sufficient clarity to guarantee a correct assessment of the just
compensation award. Should the government decide immediately to revoke or
otherwise amend the regulation, it would be liable for payment of compensation
only for the interim during which the regulation effected a "taking." Rules of
valuation already developed for temporary "takings" may be particularly
useful to the courts in their quest for assessing the proper measure of monetary
relief in cases of revocation or amendment..., although additional rules may
need to be developed.... Alternatively the government may choose formally
to condemn the property, or otherwise to continue the offending regulation: in
21. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1301 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing, inter alia,
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) and Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1971); United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
24. Id. at 415.
25. - U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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either case the action must be sustained by proper measures of just
compensation.'
Sic transit the taking issue?
2. A More Traditional View of the "Taking Issue"
A distinctly different and, until San Diego Gas & Electric Co., an
increasingly more typical view of the "taking issue" was recently
expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc.' There, the court held that a denial of permission
to develop a tidal marsh was a reasonable restriction on the use of
land. The facts are relatively straightforward.
Estuary Properties sought approval of a "Development of Re-
gional Impact" (DRI)29 from county officials to construct 26,500
dwelling courts, 11 commercial centers, 4 marinas, 5 boat
businesses, 3 golf courses and 28 acres of tennis facilities on 1,800
acres of tidal wetlands populated mainly by black mangroves.
Based on the recommendation of a regional planning council, the
county denied the application largely on the ground of environ-
mental degradation. The county indicated that development, if
permitted at all, would be permitted at no more than half the
requested density, provided certain drainage conditions were met
and local infrastructure problems were solved. An appeal to the
appropriate state administrative agency failed. The Florida Court
of Appeals reversed, directing the state administrative agency to
enter an order granting Estuary Properties permission to develop
as originally requested unless the county commenced condemna-
tion proceedings. 3°
The Florida Supreme Court, however, agreed with the county
and the agency. While agreeing that the degree to which there is a
diminution in the property's value is a factor in determining "when
the valid exercise of the police power stops and an impermissible
encroachment on private property rights begins," the court listed
five other factors as well, including whether there has been a
physical invasion, whether the regulation promotes health, safety
and welfare, and whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capri-
27. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
28. No. 58,485, slip op (Fla. Apr. 16, 1981), rev'g 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
29. Required under Florida's famous Environmental Land and Water Man-
agement Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West Supp. 1981), patterned after the
American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code.
30. No. 58,485, slip op. at 1-4 (Fla. Apr. 16, 1981).
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ciously applied. Moreover, it specifically equated the "diminu-
tion" standard with "whether the regulation precludes all econom-
ically reasonable use of the property."'"
While admitting that a regulation may be a valid exercise of the
police power and still result in a taking (Holmes strikes again as the
court cited Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon), the court observed
that "[p]rotection of environmentally sensitive areas, and pollu-
tion prevention are legitimate concerns within the police power"32
and cited with approval the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's shore-
lands preservation decision in Just v. Marinette County.33 The court
concluded:
We do not hold that any time the state requires a proposed development to be
reduced by half it may do so without compensation to the owner. We do hold
that, under the facts as found by the commission, the instant reduction is a valid
exercise of the police power .... The owner of private property is not entitled to
the highest and best use of his property if that use will create a public harm.'
Finally, even in California, government land use requirements
can be takings, as is clear from Liberty v. California Coastal
Commission.35 There, the court of appeals held that conditioning a
construction permit pursuant to its Coastal Zone Conservation
Act" upon applicants' dedicating property for free public parking
until 5 P.M. daily was unreasonable and unfair, imposing a burden
beyond the applicants' use and shifting government's burden un-
fairly to a private party.37
B. Plans as Laws
The controversy over the place of planning in land use controls
continues.3" Followers of this particular cart/horse bickering will
recall that while early model statutes called for planning to precede
zoning and for zoning to implement planning, neither in fact
occurred. One judge went so far as to equate a zoning ordinance
with a plan.39 The plan as a necessary precedent to a valid zoning
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 12.
33. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
34. No. 58,485, slip op. at 13 (Fla. Apr. 16, 1981).
35. 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
36. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE. §§ 3000-3825 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981).
37. 113 Cal. App. 3d at -, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
38. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1976).
39. Kozesnick v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957),
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ordinance was revived in Oregon and declared necessary in Fasano
v. Board of County Commissioners"° and Baker v. City of
Milwaukee.41 Ordinances not conforming to plans required by
statute were declared void. The required conformance of planning
to zoning was legislatively repeated in several states. 2 Present
conflict is not so much over whether plans are law (they often are,
though few states or their local subdivisions have gone so far as
Hawaii which wrote its state plan directly into the statute book,
word-for-word 3), but over what constitutes consistency or
conformance." What follows is the briefest of looks at the plan as
law in selected jurisdictions where current controversies have or
will add significantly to the law in this area.
1. Vermont: Act 250 and the Pyramid
The Vermonf planning law system basically converts a series of
state plans into laws by means of its well-known Act 250., The Act
provides for a series of plans, including a capability plan, to be
drawn up. It also broadly defines development, ' forbids develop-
ment without a permit, ' and requires compliance with certain
environmental and other impact criteria and certain of the plans,
once adopted. ' To hear and pass on permit applications, the Act
creates regional District Land Use Commissions, together with an
Eivironmental Board to hear and decide appeals from the District
Commission decisions. 9
In 1977, the Pyramid Company of Burlington (Pyramid) filed an
application to build an enclosed regional shopping mall in Willis-
ton. The mall was to include 2 department stores, 20 food service
establishments, and 80 other shops. It would, along with parking
for 2,000 cars, occupy approximately 90 acres on a 200-acre site a
quarter-mile from an interstate freeway.'
40. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
41. 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975).
42. Vermont, California, arguably Florida, and Hawaii.
43. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 226 (Supp. 1979).
44. See, DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DEBATE (1980).
45. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1973 & Supp. 1980). See The Quiet
Revolution in Land Use Controls, supra note 2, at ch. 2; Land Use and the States,
supra note 2, at ch. 3.
46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 6001(s) (Supp. 1980).
47. Id. § 6081(a)( 1973).
48. Id. § 6086 a (Supp. 1980).
49. Id. §§ 6086-6087 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
50. Re: Pyramid Co. of Burlington, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Vermont District Environmental Commission No. 1 (Application No. 4C0281,
1978) at 1 [hereinafter cited as Re: Pyramid Co.].
In 1978, one of Vermont's District Environmental Commissions
denied Pyramid's application. 1 As of this writing, it is still on
appeal to the Environmental Board. The findings and conclusions
(70-plus pages worth) are instructive, not only as they demonstrate
how statutes and planning land use criteria affect the land use
decision-making process, but also because they demonstrate the
wealth of data the proponents felt compelled to produce before a
quasi-judicial body charged with making the initial decision, and
show the number of parties who eventually participated. 2 In care-
fully tabulated appendix entries (number, date, party), the District
Commission lists each party and each exhibit. The exhibits number
156, over half (96) of which come from the applicant. Aside from
the applicant, the state of Vermont, Williston, and the county in
which it is situated, fourteen additional parties were admitted to
the proceedings.
The Commission, in its findings, went through each and every
criteria set forth in the Act (many of which are further subdivided
into specific directives under a broad criteria heading), carefully
setting out what exhibits and testimony were presented with re-
spect to that criteria, stating its conclusion, and discussing how it
reached that conclusion. It held that the permit must be denied
because the development failed to conform in some way to four of
the statutory criteria, including lack of conformance to the statu-
tory capability plan and the local and regional plans. 3
As noted above, Act 250 requires development conformance
with a duly adopted capability and development plan and with a
land use plan.' At the time of the application, Vermont had
enacted the former, but not the latter.5 The Commission, there-
fore, looked only to the criteria of the capability and development
plan which are set out in the Act as amended in 1973. Finding that
the application would meet the criteria regarding impact on
growth, agricultural soils and forests, earth resources, and energy
conservation,57 the Commission rejected the application for non-
conformance with the following criteria set forth in the capability
and development plan:
51. Id.
52. Id. at A-1 to B-2.
53. Id. at 3.
54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,§ 6042 (1973).
55. Re: Pyramid Co., supra note 50, at 30-31.
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(9)(a)(A)-(L) (Supp. 1980).
57. Re: Pyramid Co., supra note 50, at 30-48.
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a. We find that the development as proposed relies on central sewage treat-
ment facilities, that the Town of Williston has no capital program or plan,
and that adequate surety is not provided to the town and conditioned to
protect it in the event that it is required to assume the responsibility for thefacilities.'
b. We find that the development as proposed to be located in the Town of
Williston is not physically contiguous to an existing settlement and that the
additional costs for public services and facilities caused directly or indirectly
by the development when located on that proposed site outweigh any tax
revenue and other public benefits of the development.59
c. We find that necessary supporting highway facilities are not available and
will not be available under a duly adopted capital program when the
development is completed and that an excessive and uneconomic demand
will be placed on existing highway facilities and those that will be available
when the development is completed. We find that other necessary suppor-
tive governmental and public utility services are available or will be avail-
able under such a plan when the development is completed.'
d. We find that the development as proposed will materially interfere with the
function and efficiency of the adjacent highway network and the public's use
and enjoyment of that network. We find that the development as proposed
will not otherwise unnecessarily or unreasonably endanger the public or
quasi-public investment in any governmental or public utility facilities,
services, or lands to which the lands to be developed are adjacent, and that
the development will not otherwise materially jeopardize or interfere with
the function, efficiency, or safety of, or the public's use or enjoyment of or
access to any such facility, service, or lands."
The Act further requires the Commission to find that a proposed
development is "in conformance with" any duly adopted local or
regional plan or "capital program. "62 The regional plan had been
expressly made inapplicable to communities with adopted local
plans. 3 Here, there was some question as to whether a local plan
had been duly adopted. Although the local planning commission
had determined that the application conformed to certain aspects
of the local plan under consideration, the district commission held
that it was free to consider the matter of such conformance on its
own:
In view of the State's traditions of local self-government, as exemplified by the
provisions of 24 V.S.A. Chapter 117 regarding adoption of local plans, and the
desirability of consistency between the actions of different government agen-
cies, a local planning commission's decision that a development conforms with
the local plan would under normal circumstances lead to a similar finding by the
district environmental commission.
58. Id. at 37.
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 47.
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(10) (Supp. 1980).
63. Re: Pyramid Co., supra note 50, at 50.
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We cannot say that the Williston Planning Commission's decision was mani-
festly wrong on the basis of the evidence available to it, but if the planning
commission had been able to consider all the evidence that was before us, it
might well have decided otherwise. Not only did it point to "broader concerns
which trouble us but are outside our jurisdiction," it expressed specific "con-
cern" as to "the impact ... on traffic patterns and volumes in the Town," and
though "unable to find that the magnitude of this impact will be such as to
constitute a violation of any provision of the comprehensive plan" it was careful
to point out that this inability was "[o]n the basis of the evidentiary record."
The evidentiary record before the planning commission did not include the
detailed data later presented to us in our consideration of criterion 5. We are
convinced by this evidence that-regardless of whether there will be "un-
reasonable congestion" or "unsafe conditions" within the meaning of crite-
rion 5-the impact of vastly increased local traffic will be such as to substan-
tially impair the rural character of the Town."
The district commission did find that the regional plan had been
duly adopted and that the proposed development failed to con-
form to it as well.' It is clear from the foregoing that the major
reasons for denying Pyramid's application for permission to de-
velop a regional shopping mall are to be found in the develop-
ment's lack of conformance to state and regional plans.
2. Hawaii and the Proliferation of Plans
Among the fifty states, probably none has attempted to link plan-
ning and law so strongly as Hawaii. This is so despite the fact that
its landmark land use law, 66 dividing the land in the state into four
districts (agricultural, conservation, urban and rural), was enacted
without the benefit of a precedent state plan. This is neither the
time nor the place to discuss that law, which has been virtually
analyzed to death already.67 It is, however, critical to note that the
State Land Use Commission, the body charged under the land use
64. Id. at 52-53.
65. Id. at 55-66.
66. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205 to 205-16.2 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
67. The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control, supra note 2, D. MANDELKER,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROL LEGISLATION (1976); HIMAG, GROWTH
MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN HAWAII (1977); MYERS, ZONING HAWAII (1975);
BOSSELMAN, FUERER & SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION (1976); Callies, Land Use:
Herein of Vested Rights, Plans, and the Relationship of Planning and Controls, 2
U. HAWAII L. REv. 167 (1979); Mandelker & Kolis, Whither Hawaii? Land Use
Management in An Island State, 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 48 (1979); Selinger, Van
Dyke, Amano, Takenaka, & Young, Selected Constitutional Issues Related to
Growth Management in Hawaii, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 639 (1978); Callies, The
Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 JOUINAL/APA 135 (April 1980); Callies, Land Use
Control in An Island State: Hawaii's State-wide Zoning, 2 TIRD WORLD PLAN.
REV. 187 (1980); Dinell, Land Use Zoning in a Developing State: A Brief Critique
of Hawaii's Land Use Law, 2 THmI WORLD PLAN. REV. 195 (1980); Lowry &
McElroy, State Land Use Control: Some Lessons from Experience, 1 STATE PLAN.
IsSuEs 15 (1976).
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law with drawing the state land use district boundaries, and the
State Board of Land and Natural Resources, the body governing
the use of land in the conservation district which makes up nearly
half the state's land area, must conform their decision making and
management to the new state plan and, when adopted, the twelve
functional plans mandated therein.
a. THE STATE PLAN
Hawaii is unique among the fifty states in having converted its state
general plan into a statute, Act 100.61 Its major areas of concentra-
tion include: population, the economy (tourism, defense and other
federal spending, sugar and pineapple industries, diversified agri-
culture and potential new areas like motion picture production),
the physical environment, facility systems (water supply, trans-
portation, energy, public utility facilities, solid and liquid waste
disposal) and sociocultural advancement (housing, health, educa-
tion, social services, leisure activities, public safety and cultural
heritage) .6
The Hawaii state plan is divided into three major parts dealing
with goals, objectives and policies,7" planning implementation and
coordination," and priority directions.' The goals are divided into
the areas of the economy, the physical environment, and the
physical, social and economic well-being.73 Objectives, steps to-
ward related goals, reflect "end-states toward which concentrated
effort is focused."74 Policies are designed to achieve the
objectives.7"
The all-important implementation strategy is accomplished
through several mechanisms. A policy council of state, county and
public representatives advises the legislature and reconciles con-
flicts between the agencies and plans described below. Twelve
functional plans, to be passed by concurrent legislative resolution,
are to define, implement, and conform to the themes, goals, objec-
tives, policies, and priority directions of the state plan. The county
plans (general and development) must at least indicate general
68. HAwAn REV. STAT. § 226-1 to -105 (Supp. 1979).
69. DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE PLAN
(1978) [hereinafter cited as THE STATE PLAN].
70. HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 226-5 to -28 (Supp. 1979).
71. Id. §§ 226-51 to -63.
72. Id. §§ 226-101 to -105.
73. THE STATE PLAN, supra note 69, at 19.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id.
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population levels and development patterns, and conform to the
aforesaid theme, goals, policies, objectives and priority directions.
State programs are to carry out the state plan and must conform to
both it and the functional plans. The county and functional plan-
ning processes are to be coordinated with the end product, based
one upon the other, in the implementation of the state plan.7"
That part of the state plan dealing with implementation and
conformance is the most significant for the purpose of land use and
control. This is so because the state plan requires conformance to
its policies, goals, objectives and priority direction across virtually
the whole spectrum of state and county land use actions.
First, the state plan makes it clear that all state programs are to
conform with its theme, goals, objectives, policies and priority
directions. "State programs shall be in conformance with this chap-
ter. The formulation, administration, and implementation of state
programs shall be in conformance with the overall theme, goals,
objectives, policies, and priority directions contained within this
chapter, and the state functional plans adopted pursuant to this
chapter.'"I These state programs:
shall include, but not be limited to, those programs involving coordination and
review; research and support; design; construction, and maintenance; services;
and regulatory powers. State programs that exercise coordination and review
functions shall include, but not be limited to, the state clearinghouse process,
capital improvements program, and coastal zone management program. State
programs that exercise regulatory powers in resource allocation shall include
but not be limited to the land use and management programs administered by
the land use commission and the board of land and natural resources. State
programs shall further define, implement, and be in conformance with the
overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions contained
within this chapter, and the state functional plans adopted pursuant to this
chapter. '
As indicated, state programs must conform to the functional plans
as well. Certain programs relating to land use control are singled
out as "implementation mechanisms":
(D) Decision-making process of the state land use commission. The decisions
made by the land use commission shall be in conformance with the overall
theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions contained within this
chapter, and the state functional plans adopted pursuant to this chapter. The
rules and regulations adopted by the land use commission to govern land use
decision making shall be in conformance with the provisions of this chapter.
76. Id. at 21-24.
77. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 226-62(a) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
78. Id. §§ 226-52(a)(5) (emphasis added).
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(E) Decision-making process of the board of land and natural resources. The
decision made by the board of land and natural resources shall be in conform-
ance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions
contained within this chapter, and the state functional plans adopted pursuant to
this chapter. The rules and regulations adopted by the board of land and natural
resources to govern land use decision making shall be in conformance with the
provisions of this chapter. 9
While broad policies are sketched in the state plan, it is the
functional plan to which state and county agencies must look for
direction." The state plan provides for the preparation of at least
twelve such plans to be adopted by legislative concurrent
resolution. 1 "State functional plans shall be prepared for, but not
limited to, the areas of agriculture, conservation lands, education,
energy, higher education, health, historic preservation, housing,
recreation, tourism, transportation, and water resources devel-
opment. "'
The functional plans must "define, implement, and be in con-
formance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and
priority directions contained within this chapter. County general
plans and development plans shall be used as a basis in the formula-
tion of state functional plans. "" The State Plan Act also sets out
basic requirements for the functional plans:
(b) The functional plan shall contain objectives to be achieved and policies to
be pursued in the primary field of activity and such policies shall address major
programs and the location of major facilities. The functional plan shall also
contain implementation priorities and actions which may include, but not be
limited to, programs, maps, regulatory measures, standards, and interagency
coordination provisions.'
The initial responsibility for preparing each functional plan lies
with named state agenciesu which are required to submit their
plans periodically to an advisory committee and to the policy
council.8
After it became apparent that the size of the twelve draft func-
tional plans first submitted to the legislature in 1977 (200-400
pages each) made them unwieldy for the purpose of providing the
requested specific directions to state and county agencies, the
79. Id. §§ 226-52(b) (2)(D)(E) (emphasis added).
80. Id. §§ 226-52(a (4).
81. Id. §§ 226-57(a), 226-58(c)(d).
82. Id. §§ 226-52(a)(3) (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. §§ 226-57(b).
85. Id. §§ 226-57(a).
86. Id. §§ 226-58.
policy council issued draft guidelines 7 modifying the organization
of the plans. Essentially, the draft plans were to be divided into two
parts:
(i) A "technical reference document," to serve as a "principle implementation
guide" and containing "essential background information, detailed discus-
sion of current conditions, issues and trends, technical data and analysis,
and other information necessary to support the objectives, plans, and
policies and implementation priorities presented in the State Functional
Plan (Plan Document)." In other words, much of the tedious descriptive
material has been stripped from the functional plan itself.
(ii) A "Plan document," which is to "detail objectives and policies to be
presumed in the functional area and specify short- and long-term actions to
be undertaken." '
Unfortunately, in 1981 the legislature refused for the third year
to pass any functional plans.
The state plan requirements also have significant consequences
for the counties which have their own "plans-as-laws" systems.
One requirement tying state and county plans together is that
"[t]he county general plans and development plans shall be in
conformance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies,
and priority directions contained in this chapter by January,
1982."1 This directive is particularly critical to the county land use
regulatory scheme since, as discussed below, most county land use
control schemes are tied so directly to their general or develop-
ment plans that land use changes made contrary to those plans are
invalid. 9°
87. POLICY COUNCIL, PREPARATION OF STATE FUNCTIONAL PLANS, ch. II
(May 23, 1980).
88. Id. at 11-25.
89. HAwAI REV. STAT. §§ 226-61(c) (Supp. 1979).
90. Id. §§ 226-61:
(a) The county general plans and development plans shall be formulated with
input from the state and county agencies as well as the general public.
County general plans or development plans shall indicate desired popula-
tion and physicaldevelopment patterns for each county and regions within
each county. In addition, county general plans or development plans shall
address the unique problems and needs of each county and regions within
each county. The county general plans or development plans shall further
define and implement applicable provisions of this chapter, provided that
any amendment to the county general plan of each county shall not be
contrary to the county charter. The formulation, amendment, and imple-
mentation of county general plans or development plans shall utilize as
guidelines, statewide objectives, policies, and programs stipulated in state
nctional plans adopted in consonance with this chapter.
(b) County general plans shall be formulated on the basis of sound rationale,
data analyses, and input from state and county agencies and the general
public, and contain objectives and policies as required by the charter of
each county. Further, the county general plans should:
(1) Contain objectives to be achieved and policies to be pursued with respect to
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b. COUNTY PLANS
The charter provisions of Hawaii's four counties relate planning to
zoning. The charter for the city and county of Honolulu very
closely bind the two. "No public improvement or project, or
subdivision or zoning ordinance shall be initiated or adopted unless
it conforms to and implements the development plan for that
area."91 This language, with differences as discussed below,
formerly applied to the adopted general plan, but the general plan,
now passed by resolution, has only advisory status.' Although
development plans have not yet been adopted, the charter is quite
clear as to what they shall contain:
Development Plans. "Development plans" mean relatively detailed schemes
for implementing and accomplishing the development objectives and policies
of the general plan within the several parts of the city. A development plan shall
include a map of the area of the city to which it is applicable; shall contain
statements of standards and principles with respect to land uses within the area
for residential, recreational, agricultural, commercial, industrial, institutional,
open spaces and other purposes and statements of urban design principles and
controls; and shall identify areas, sites and structures of historical, archeological,
architectural or scenic significance, a system of public thoroughfares, highways
and streets, and the location, relocation and improvement of public buildings,
public or private facilities for utilities, terminals and drainage. It shall state the
desirable sequence for development and other purposes as may be important
and consistent with the orderly implementation of the general plan.
Development plans may contain statements identifying the present condi-
tions and major problems relating to development, physical deterioration
and the location of land uses and the social, economic and environmental
effects thereof; may show the projected nature and rate of change in present
conditions for the reasonably foreseeable future based on a projection of
current trends; and may forecast the probable social, economic and environ-
mental consequences of such changes."
population density, land use, transportation system location, public and
community facility locations, water and sewage system locations, visitor
destinations, urban design and all other matters necessary for the coordi-
nated development of each county and regions within each county.
(2) Contain implementation priorities and actions to carry out policies to
include but not be limited to, land use maps,programs, projects, regula-
tory measures, standards and principles and interagency coordination
provisions.
91. Id. § 5-412 to -413 (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 5-408. General Plan. The general plan shall set forth the city's broad
policies for the long range development of the city. It shall contain statements of
the general social, economic, environmental and design objectives to be achieved
for the general welfare and prosperity of the people of the city through govern-
ment action, city, state or federal. The statements shall include, but not be limited
to, policy and development objectives to be achieved with respect to the distribu-
tion of social benefits, the most desirable uses of land within the city, the overall
circulation pattern and the most desirable population densities within the several
areas of the city.
93. Id. § 5-409 (emphasis added).
Given the language of both this section and the section quoted
above, some commentators have suggested that all preexisting
zoning must also accord with the new development plans, once
adopted. This was the position taken by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in 197591 when it interpreted legislation requiring that
zoning be in accordance with the comprehensive plan of a more
general nature than that of Hawaii. In summary, since local zoning
and subdivision ordinances must at least prospectively conform to
the county development plans, and since these plans must conform
to the state plan and, if passed, be based upon the twelve func-
tional plans, it is fair to characterize Hawaii as a state in which the
plan is, indeed, law.
3. New Jersey Pinelands
Not everyone is agreed that a plan, even one set up as law, ought to
have the effect of law. Re: Pyramid Co. of Burlington is one
example of how a controversy might arise. Basically, however, the
plan itself is under collateral attack. This is not so with one of the
newest plans made into law which was recently developed to apply
to New Jersey's pinelands.
In 1979, New Jersey passed the Pinelands Protection Act95 in
order to implement, preserve and protect its famous pine
barrens.' Slightly under 1 million acres in size and spread over
seven counties, the pinelands area is protected by a comprehensive
management plan in order to effectuate both state and federal
management and preservation policy.' The plan itself is the pro-
duct of a fifteen-member pinelands commission98 established by
the Act. Among other things, the plan is directed by statute to
contain:
1. A resource assessment, including scenic, aesthetic, cultural
and open space areas.
94. Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975).
95. The Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:18A-1 to -29 (1979)
as amended by Laws of 1980, ch. 65, adopted July 10, 1980.
96. See J. MCPHEE, THE PINE BARRENS (1967).
97. The National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 also provides for a federal
reserve in the pinelands. 16 U.S.C. § 471i (Supp. 111979). The federal reserve is
substantially congruent with the state reserve. The Act authorizes the state
program which S. No. 3091 is intended to implement. See New Jersey Pinelands
Comprehensive Management Plan at XVIII-XIX (Nov. 21, 1980).
98. One member was chosen from each of the seven counties, seven were
appointed by the then governor of New Jersey and one was appointed by the
secretary of the interior. The Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 13:18A-1 to -29 (1979), as amended by Laws of 1980, ch. 65, adopted July 10,
1980.
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2. A map showing the boundaries of the Pinelands National
Reserve," including areas of critical ecological importance.
3. A land use capability map and a comprehensive statement of
policy for planning and managing the development and use of
land in the pinelands area, including land use techniques such
as zoning, permit systems, transfer of development rights,
and so forth, and including a policy for use of the police
power to regulate while recognizing existing economic activi-
ties within the area.
4. Detailed financial plans for the acquisition of certain areas.'°
Dividing the pinelands into a protection and a preservation area,
the statute sets out the following separate goals for each:
The goal of the comprehensive management plan with respect to the entire
pinelands area shall be to protect, preserve and enhance the significant values
of the resources thereof in a manner which is consistent with the purposes and
provisions of this act and the Federal Act.
b. The goals of the comprehensive management plan with respect to the
protection area shall be to:
(1) Preserve and maintain the essential character of the existing pinelands
environment, including the plant and animal species indigenous thereto and the
habitat therefor;
(2) Protect and maintain the quality of surface and ground waters;
(3) Promote the continuation and expansion of agricultural and horticultural
uses;
(4) Discourage piecemeal and scattered development; and
(5) Encourage appropriate patterns of compatible residential, commercial and
industrial development, in or adjacent to areas already utilized for such pur-
poses, in order to accommodate regional growth influences in an orderly way
while protecting the pinelands environment from the individual and cumulative
adverse impacts thereof.
c. The goals of the comprehensive management plan with respect to the
preservation area shall be to:
(1) Preserve an extensive and contiguous area of land in its natural state,
thereby insuring the continuation of a pinelands environment which contains
the unique and significant ecological and other resources representative of the
pinelands area;
(2) Promote compatible agricultural, horticultural and recreational uses, in-
cluding hunting, fishing and trapping, within the framework of maintaining a
pinelands environment;
(3) Prohibit any construction or development which is incompatible with the
preservation of this unique area;
(4) Provide a sufficient amount of undeveloped land to accommodate specific
wilderness management practices, such as selective burning, which are neces-
sary to maintain the special ecology of the preservation area; and
99. Id.
100. Id.
(5) Protect and preserve the quantity and quality of existing surface and ground
waters. "I
In the summer of 1980, a management plan for preservation uses
was duly adopted by the commission."u The one for the protection
area followed,"3 and the entire management plan was adopted late
in 1980.104 It is this event which triggers the rather straightforward
conformance requirement that converts the plan into law. Each
county located in the pineland area must, within a year of the
adoption of the management plan, revise its master plan to imple-
ment the management plan's objectives and conform with the
management plan's minimum standards. 5 Each municipality must
review both its plans and its land use ordinances. 04
The plan or plans appear to have become law though apparently
not without litigation. According to recent reports,"° a coalition of
landowners, real estate agents and builders have sued to stop the
enforcement of the management plan, alleging that the develop-
ment restrictions on private property contained therein, together
with what they regard as inadequate funds available to make
purchases, constitute a taking of property. The first case,
Township of Folsom v. NewJersey,04 was brought in the state court
by two municipalities, a coalition of farmers and an individual
landowner challenging the comprehensive management plan on
the "taking" issue and on procedural grounds. A hearing is ex-
pected in the fall of 1982.10
The second case, Hovson's, Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior,"'
was brought in federal court by all the plaintiffs in Township of
Folsom together with Hovson's, Inc., a land developer, and the
Coalition for Sensible Preservation of the Pinelands, real estate,
banking and building interests.' The parties sought to enjoin the
101. Id.
102. The Pinelander, Aug. 15, 1980, at 1.
103. The Pinelander, Oct. 1, 1980, at 1.
104. See New Jersey Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan, supra note
97.
105. The Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-1 to 29 (1979), as
amended by Laws of 1980, ch. 65, adopted July 10, 1980.
106. Id.
107. LAND USE PLANNiNG REPORT at 126 (April 20, 1981); letter from Richard
M. Hluchan, New Jersey Deputy Attorney General, to author (May 11, 1981).
108. No. - (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., filed Jan. 6,1981). A stay of the plan
pending the outcome of the case was denied on January 12, 1981.
109. Letter from Richard M. Hluchan, New Jersey Deputy Attorney General,
to author (May 11, 1981).
110. No. 81-97 (D.N.J., filed Jan. 12, 1981).
111. Letter from Richard M. Hluchan, New Jersey Deputy Attorney General,
to author (May 11, 1981).
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approval of the management plan. The plan was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior on January 16, 1981, and the complaint
was promptly amended to challenge the approval on the "taking"
issue and NEPA procedural grounds. A preliminary injunction
was denied on April 22, 1981, and a written opinion on the merits is
expected shortly."'
4. Rezoning as a Legislative Act
This section is a final note on the continuing saga of whether land
use change is a legislative or a quasi-judicial act. In a decision
already questioned by a leading commentator on land use
matters,"' the California Supreme Court held that a subdivision
approved, regardless of size, is always a quasi-judicial act, and
arguably, a rezoning is always a legislative act." ' By so holding, it
reversed the appropriate California district court which had
adopted the rule of Fasano 5 with which we are all familiar. Sic
semper California!
C. Amortizing Nonconformities..6
The issue of nonconformities and how to deal with them has beset
zoning administrations, planning commissions, boards of appeal
and local councils since the beginning of zoning and before." 7
What can be done with a use which lawfully existed prior to the
enactment or amendment of a zoning ordinance, but which does
not now comply yet continues to exist? Unfortunately, these uses,
now granted virtually monopoly status by the new zoning provi-
sions which prohibit the establishment of other like uses or struc-
tures, generally refuse to fade away."'
1. Metromedia: A Case in Point
Long the province, if not the nemesis, of the zoning practitioner,
the nonconformity has from time to time risen to national attention
112. Id.
113. HAGMAN, PUBLIC CONTROL OF CALIFORNIA LAND DEVELOPMENT: AN
UPDATE (1980).
114. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 98 Cal. 3d 567, - P.2d __, 159
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1980).
115. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
116. Much of this section is taken from the report of the Subcommittee on
Amortization and Nonconforming Uses, a subcommittee both suggested and
chaired by Dwight E. Merriam of Robinson, Robinson & Cole, Hartford, Con-
necticut. For a thorough discussion of the issues and cases touched upon here,
that subcommittee report is a gold mine of information.
117. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (a "prezoning case).
118. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.02 (2d ed. Supp. 1980).
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when often novel attempts to terminate it come to the attention of
the highest state or federal courts." 9 So it is now in the matter of
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 1 presently pending before
the United States Supreme Court. On March 14, 1972, the San
Diego City Council adopted a comprehensive billboard ordinance
which included, among its purposes, the objective "to eliminate
excessive and confusing sign displays which do not relate to the
premises on which they are located .... "121 The ordinance includes
a variable amortization schedule based on adjusted market value,
defined as original cost less ten percent depreciation per year for
each year the sign has been in place prior to April 13, 1972, the
effective date of the ordinance.
The plaintiffs owned 500 to 800 billboards in the city and chal-
lenged the ordinance on six grounds, including a claim that the
abatement schedule was unconstitutional. The trial court held for
the plaintiffs on grounds of overbreadth and the involvement of
free speech. The intermediate appellate court affirmed."
The California Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's
decision, answering six critical questions in favor of the city. The
court held: (1) Elimination of billboards is a proper exercise of the
police power"2 even on aesthetic grounds alone.12 4 (2) "Prohibition
of off-site billboards does not violate the First Amendment."121 (3)
Elimination of billboards without compensation does not deny the
owners equal protection of the law. (4) The amortization sched-
ule of one to four years is not unreasonable on its face, though it
may be as to a particular sign.1' 7 (5) The issue of noncompliance
with the California Environmental Quality Act was summarily
dismissed because it was not raised in the complaints." s (6) The
ordinance is not preempted by the California Outdoor Advertising
Act.
129
119. E.g., Jones v. Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); Art Neon Co. v.
Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1973).
120. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, cert. granted, - U.S.
-, 101 S. Ct. 265 (1980).
121. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 101.0700.A (1972).
122. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67 Cal. App. 3d 84,136 Cal. Rptr.
453 (1977).
123. 26 Cal. 3d at 859, 610 P.2d at 412, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
124. Id. at 861, 610 P.2d at 412, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
125. Id. at 867, 610 P.2d at 417, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
126. Id. at 881, 610 P.2d at 426, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
127. Id. at 883, 610 P.2d at 428, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
128. Id. at 885, 610 P.2d at 429, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
129. Id. at 873, 610 P.2d at 421, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
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However, on rehearing, the court decided that the Highway
Reactification Act compels compensation for the removal of bill-
boards within 660 feet of a federal interstate or primary highway. 30
2. Termination: "Passive" Techniques
Termination, whether or not by amortization, is not the only
technique which has been applied over the years by communities
seeking to rid themselves of nonconformities.131 The more passive
techniques include the following:
a. CHANGE OF USE
Generally, while nonconforming uses may continue, local regula-
tions control conversions under one or more of four approaches:
(i) A nonconforming use may be changed to a conforming use; (ii)
A nonconforming use may be changed only to one which is "less
nonconforming, .... more desirable," or permitted in an earlier and
more restrictive district; (iii) A nonconforming use may be
changed to one which is first permitted in the district; and (iv) A
nonconforming use may be changed to any similar use.'32
Apparently, communities have wide latitude in establishing reg-
ulations of this type."' Problems arising from the use of this tech-
nique include: categorizing the existing and new nonconforming
uses, measuring the impact of the new nonconforming use, con-
verting accessory uses, changing ownership, and relocation of
use. 11
b. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST EXPANSION
Local ordinances frequently prohibit or severely restrict the ex-
pansion of a nonconformity. Sometimes expansion is allowed by
special permit. Practical and theoretical problems often result in
characterizing a change as an expansion which may include an
increase in floor area,'35 an increase in lot area used,"3 a change in
130. Id. at 877, 610 P.2d at 423, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
131. For general discussion of nonconformities and termination, see
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING at ch. 6 (2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1980);
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING at chs. 58-62 (4th ed. 1980);
ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS at ch. 41 (1978 & Supp. 1980);
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 391-561 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
132. ANDERSON, supra note 131, at §§ 6.32-6.41.
133. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 112.03.
134. ANDERSON, supra note 131, at § 6.34-.38.
135. Yuba City v. Cherniavsky, 117 Cal. App. 568, 4 P.2d 299 (1931).
136. Conway v. City of Greenville, 254 S.C. 96, 173 S.E.2d 648 (1970).
business or addition of new activities,'37 and an increase in the
intensity of the use.'-' These changes often are treated differently
in the regulations or by the courts.'39
c. RESTRICTIONS ON RECONSTRUCTION
Zoning ordinances often provide that if a nonconforming use is
destroyed or damaged beyond a certain percent of its value as the
result of a fire or other catastrophe, the use cannot be
reestablished.' Some states protect the right to rebuild by
statute.41 Problems have been encountered where the percentage
reduction is based on assessed value or other formulae which make
it impossible to rebuild after even minor damage.4 2 An intermedi-
ate approach, as with the restrictions on expansion technique, is to
use the special permit procedure to allow reconstruction.' 3
d. ABANDONMENT
Zoning regulations often include a provision that once a noncon-
forming use is abandoned, discontinued or ceases for a period, it
cannot be resumed. Some enabling statutes authorize an objective
test by providing for a time period for the discontinuance after
which the use may not be resumed and by excluding any considera-
tion of intent.'" Intent and the subject test predominate, although,
as one commentator notes, little care has been given to thinking
through this area of American planning law.'45
In addition to discontinuance, therefore, intent usually must be
proved through physical change, change in business practices,
conveyance or attempted conveyance for a different use or passage
of time." Still, at least a dozen states accept the objective test and
do not consider intent.47
137. First Crestwood Corp. v. Building Inspector of Middleton, 3 Mass. App.
Ct. 234, 326 N.E.2d 363 (1975).
138. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Avon, 150
Conn. 439, 190 A.2d 594 (1963); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 113.01.
139. Pennsylvania, unlike other states, has developed a doctrine that there is a
constitutional right to expand nonconforming uses. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at
§ 113.08.
140. State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 A. 294 (1929).
141. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A § 5 (West 1979).
142. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 114.04.
143. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 114.07, citing Chilson v. Zoning Bd. ol
Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406, 182 N.E.2d 535 (1962).
144. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 115.05.
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 115.04.
146. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 115.08; Kuhl v. Zoning Hearing Bd. o
Greene Township, - Pa. Commw. Ct. __, 415 A.2d 954 (1980) (intent is
question of fact).
147. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 115.14; Fuller v. City of New Orleans
Department of Safety and Permits, Building Inspection & Permits, 311 So. 2d 46(
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These techniques, however, do not assure the eventual elimina-
tion of nonconformities. Phased termination, or amortization,
does.
3. Termination by Active Means (Amortization)
Amortization is the compulsory termination without compensa-
tion of a nonconforming use after a period of time. While the
immediate termination of the nonconforming use of a parcel for a
brick kiln was upheld in the well-known prezoning case,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 1, that case and a few others are dramatic
exceptions to judicial hostility toward compulsory termination.'4 9
Until the 1950s, the prevailing view, as expressed in the leading
case of Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 10 was that zoning regulations
could not work retroactively to terminate existing uses except in
the clearest cases of overriding public necessity. 5' An exception
was the so-called "nuisance" termination cases.
Certain nonconforming uses are so detrimental to the public
health and safety that the courts have upheld immediate
elimination.'52 In Norton Shores v. Carr,'53 for example, an appel-
La. App. 1975); City of Chicago v. Cohen, 49 11. App. 3d 342, 364 N.E.2d 335
1977).
148. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
149. WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at §§ 116.02-.06. Other early cases of interest
are: Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upheld establishment of
slaughtering monopoly in New Orleans and termination elsewhere); Hottinger v.
New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 629, 8 So. 575 (1890) (upheld termination on public
health grounds of nonconforming dairies within one year); Murat v. City of New
Orleans, 119 La. 505, 44 So. 279(1907) and City of New Orleans v. Murat, 119 La.
1093, 44 So. 898 (1907) (upheld termination of nonconforming dairies within ten
years using balancing test of public and private good); State ex rel. National Oil
Works of Louisiana v. McShane, 159 La. 723, 106 So. 252 (1925) (upheld
termination of nonconforming filling station); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
McDonald, 168 La. 172,121 So. 613 (1929), appeal dismissed, 280 U.S. 556 (1929)
(upheld by a 4 to 3 vote the termination within one year of nonconforming grocery
store deemed to be a public nuisance by local regulation); State ex rel. Dema
Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) (upheld termination within
one year).
150. 211 Cal. 304, 295 P.14 (1930).
151. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at § 116.05. In Jones, the regula-
tions required the removal of sanitariums which probably had no negative impact
on the surrounding residential neighborhood. Other cases of interest are: People
v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952) (upheld termination of noncon-
forming keeping of pigeons, but narrowed the reach of amortization law to uses of
inconsequentialvalue). Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d
327 (1955) (town may not require removal of equipment from nonconforming
r avel pit); O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949)
disallowed termination of nonconforming pool hall as not reasonably related to
purposes of zoning); City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 582, 116 N.E.2d
697 (1953) (denied termination of junkyard under terms of ordinance giving city
council almost unlimited discretion in setting amortization period).
152. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
153. 81 Mich. App. 715, 265 N.W.2d 802 (1978).
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late court upheld a trial court's holding that it could find that a
nonconforming use was a nuisance and enjoin that use or order
elimination of objectionable features. In this case, the owners of a
junkyard and landscaping business were orderd to build a fence to
screen the front view and reduce airborne dust."M The vested rights
doctrine may not apply when public health is in issue, as in requir-
ing a connection to a public sewer. 5 In short, it may be possible to
terminate certain uses immediately or after a short period or to
impose more rigorous regulations on such uses, if a clear link can
be shown with the need to protect public health and safety.
In the last three decades, there has been a remarkable shift in the
law toward support for the compulsory termination of noncon-
forming uses.'56 Notable decisions during the early period of the
shift upheld the termination of a Florida filling station in ten
years,'57 the termination in five years of certain nonconforming
uses in Los Angeles, 5 ' the removal of billboards after five years,'59
and the removal of junkyards in two years."6 At least four distinct
types of amortization regulations can be identified.
a. FIXED PERIODS
The most often used technique is to fix a time period after which a
nonconforming use must be terminated. The regulations occa-
sionally provide for different time periods for different types of
uses. The immediate termination of a nonconforming use is infre-
quently attempted and not often upheld. 6' Typical approaches
which have been upheld include: three-year amortization of non-
conforming signs in an historic district,'62 two-year period for dis-
154. See also Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township, 42 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 458, 401 A.2d 392 (1979).
155. Renne v. Waterford, 73 Mich. App. 685, 252 N.W.2d 842 (1977).
156. See, e.g., Matter of Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553,152 N.E.2c
42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958), cited with approval in Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v
Weise, 72 A.D.2d 254, 424 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980) (court suggests town conside
amortization).
157. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 87 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Fla. 1949)
aff'd, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S. 892 (1950).
158. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
159. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301,129 A.2d 36
(1957).
160. Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 31'
P.2d 798 (1957).
161. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327, 121
N.Y.S.2d 154 (1955) (immediate removal of gravel pit invalidated); Jones v. Cit,
of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304,295 P. 14 (1930); Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64
30 A.2d 527 (1943).
162. Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 33:
(1973).
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continuing an automobile junkyard, 163 one-year period within
which to discontinue or screen an automobile junkyard,'" five-year
period for discontinuing nonconforming use of premises other
than buildings,'" and seven-year amortization period for eliminat-
ing a dog kennel.'" The obvious fault with using a fixed period of
amortization is that it fails to comprehend fully the variable econo-
mic burden on property owners resulting from differing levels of
investment. The courts often look at many facts particular to a
nonconforming use to determine if the fixed period is
reasonable. 1 67
b. PERIODS KEYED TO INVESTMENT OR VALUE
One alternative to fixed periods is to establish the length of the
period on the basis of the investment in the use or its present value.
The best-known use of this type is described in Art Neon Co. v.
Denver'" in which longer amortization periods were allowed for
signs of higher replacement value. Although the court found the
regulations to be basically reasonable, it invalidated the variable
amortization periods as unrelated to any considerations of the
"reasonableness" test. The use of this technique has been upheld
in other instances.'" The principal shortcoming of this approach is
that it fails to recognize several other characteristics of uses which
may justify longer or shorter periods of amortization. 70
c. VARIABLE PERIOD SET BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Some amortization regulations grant a local land use legislative
board the power to set a reasonable amortization period based on a
variety of factors. Courts have upheld several such regulatory
schemes incorporating considerations of the character of the
neighborhood and the need to have all properties conform to the
163. Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 317
P.2d 798 (1957).
164. LaChapelle v. Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967).
165. City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
166. Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
167. Gough v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 21 Md. App. 697, 321 A.2d 315
(1974) (held three-year period not unreasonable where cash investment in junk-
yard was minimal, the operation was of marginal value, and automobiles could be
removed at no cost to the operators).
168. 488 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1973).
169. Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (upheld amortiza-
tion of drive-in grocery store over period related to recovery of the value of
improvements).
170. What is the "investment" to be amortized is discussed in Harris v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 35 Md. App. 572, 371 A.2d 706, 708-09 (1977).
zoning regulations.'7 The courts, however, are not in agreement as
to the validity of using a variable period, particularly when they
confront the underlying issue of vested property rights.'7
The obvious advantage of this approach is that it allows "fine-
tuning" of the amortization period and is capable of balancing the
competing objectives of maximizing recovery of the investment in
the improvement, protecting the property owner from undue eco-
nomic burden, minimizing the impact on surrounding uses and
promoting the orderly development of the neighborhood. Care-
fully drafted local regulations are necessary if this technique is to
be defensible. Enabling legislation may be helpful.
d. NEGOTIATED PERIOD
In a few instances, courts have upheld amortization periods estab-
lished by agreement between governmental authority and the
private landowner.173 In one instance, the owner of a nonconform-
ing park was allowed to expand the use by special permit in return
for agreeing to discontinue the use entirely in a shorter period thain
allowed by the ordinance. 174 Agreements to terminate may be
reached in settlement of an enforcement action 175 and may remair
effective even after annexation of the area by a municipality whicl.
allows nonconforming uses to continue.'76
For those jurisdictions without the clear authority to amortizc
nonconformities, the negotiated approach offers some help. Ex.
pansion of nonconformities by special permit could be tied to ar
agreement to terminate the use. Whether this will work probabl 3
depends on a variety of economic factors beyond the scope of thi!
review. 77
4. Amortization in Action
The type of use often suggests appropriate amortization tech
niques. Open uses, such as junkyards and lumber storage yards
171. ANDERSON, supra note 131, at § 6.70 citing Dallas v. Halbert, 246 S.W.2,
686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Dallas v. Fifey, 359 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. Apr
1962); People v. Gates, 41 Cal. App. 3d 590, 116 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1974).
172. Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953). See alsc
Annot., 42 A.L.R. 2d 1140 (1945).
173. ANDERSON, supra note 131, at § 6.71.
174. Edwards v. Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953)
175. North Castle v. Windmill Farm Homes, Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 551, 23
N.Y.S.2d 551 (1962).
176. City of Mahtomedi v. Spychalla, 308 Minn. 429, 243 N.W.2d 31 (1976]
177. Among the factors may be present value of future use; increase in shor
term profits; the present level of profits; and the owner's reservation price.
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are obvious candidates for rapid amortization by police power
regulation alone. Where physical improvements are of small value
and the cost of removing materials stored on the property is little,
the courts have been willing to find short periods of amortization
reasonable."17
For billboards and other signs, various amortization techniques
are appropriate. The Metromedia case has already been discussed.
Other courts have also generally upheld amortization periods for
signs." Running through the many cases in this area are several
considerations: the capital investment in signs is usually not sub-
stantial; many signs have been in use for a long time; signs are a
severe form of visual blight; there are many alternatives for adver-
tising; the elimination of a sign seldom leaves a property with no
reasonable beneficial use; and the character of whatever rights are
vested is such that these rights deserve little protection.
In conclusion, the Metromedia case raises the question of full or
partial compensation for the termination of nonconforming uses. "I
Some uses with large capital investment simply will require too
long a period to amortize the cost of the improvements. One
commentator argues that to amortize obnoxious uses is unfair to
the neighborhoods which suffer the burden.' The answer may be
immediate or accelerated termination with full or partial com-
pensation by utilizing the eminent domain power." The fiscal
realities of today's economy, however, may prevent much use of
this approach. A favorable decision by the Supreme Court in
Metromedia will open the door to more aggressive programs to
eliminate certain nonconformities. A restrictive decision is likely
to inhibit the development of strategies based solely on regulation,
but may stimulate consideration of full and partial compensation
for eliminating nonconforming uses.
178. See ROHAN, supra note 131, at § 41.04[3][a].
179. Id. at § 41.04[3][a].
180. Following close on the heels of Metromedia is United Business Comm. v.
City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 154 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1979).
181. ANDERSON, supra note 131, at § 6.72.
182. This taking would be for a public purpose. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). Some enabling statutes provide for the condemnation of nonconforming
uses and structures. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.02 (1977). Such statutes
may preclude local efforts, even by chartered municipality, to use the police
power to force termination. City of Scottsdale v. Scottsdale Associated Mer-
chants, Inc., 120 Ariz. 4, 583 P.2d 891 (1978) (local ordinance declaring noncon-
formity signs illegal is void because it conflicts with state law).
D. Increasing Housing Opportunities through
Land Use Planning and Zoning"8
1. Exclusionary Zoning
The use of zoning or other land use control mechanisms to exclude
various ethnic, racial or economic minorities has been a fact of land
use control life virtually since the inception of zoning itself."8 The
continuing saga of the Village of Arlington Heights and the
attempt of the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
to build low- and moderate-income multifamily housing there has
added much to the law of exclusionary zoning."' The more salient
points include: A constitutional challenge will fail unless it can be
shown that the local authority intended to discriminate;"' never-
theless, it is also possible to show such intent by less than an overt
expression."s Fortunately, that litigation has, after nearly ten
years, now been concluded. Although the case was settled by
consent decree, the Seventh Circuit thereafter entertained objec-
tions to the decree made by a nearby village and others who had
intervened in the district court proceeding." The issue raised on
appeal was whether the district court properly entered the decree
which ended the dispute. The site specified in the consent decree
for the development of federally subsidized, low-cost housing was
property then outside Arlington Heights, which was to be annexed
183. For research and the presentation of a subcommittee report on this
section, I am indebted to Marc D. Brookman and Amy E. Slater of Duane,
Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia, and Frederic Hu, a third-year law student at
the University of Hawaii School of Law.
184. Indeed, some commentators have declared that to be the sole purpose of
zoning. See e.g., HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1980). See generally BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING (ASPO 1975).
185. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 373 F.
Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974), 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 429
U.S. 252 (1977), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978), 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979), afftd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir.
1980). For comments, see Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary
Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217 (1977); Callies
& Weaver, The Arlington Heights Case: The Exclusion of Exclusionary Zoning
Challenges, 2 REAL EST. ISSUES 22 (1977); Callies & Weaver, The Arlington
Heights Case: A Reprise, 3 REAL EST. ISSUES 37 (1978).
186. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977).
187. Id. ; Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977).
188. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
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and rezoned. ' The court noted that the present case aligned the
interests of both local and national government against the alleged
rights of the neighboring individual landowners who claimed that
the value and marketability of their property would be reduced by
the relief granted in the consent decree." The court further noted
that the authority to zone the subject property rested solely in
Arlington Heights pursuant to a boundary agreement of June 21,
1976 and that the Board of Trustees of Arlington Heights
approved the consent decree as a legislative act. Neighboring
landowners were unable to prove that this legislative zoning deter-
mination bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare. 191 The court found that both the national
policy of the Fair Housing Act of 196819 and the state policy
establish that the annexation and rezoning required of Arlington
Heights by the consent decree bears a substantial relation to the
general welfare."' Furthermore, the court noted that there is no
per se rule against ordering remedial efforts beyond the municipal
boundaries of the city where the constitutional violation
occurred.194 In approving a settlement, a trial court is not required
to inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and
resolve the merits as long as the settlement is "fair, adequate,
reasonable and appropriate" under the particular facts and there
has been valid consent by the concerned parties. In the absence of
plain error, abuse of discretion, arbitrary action or a failure to
determine that a settlement is equitable and in the public interest,
an agreement will not be reversed on appeal. 95
189. Id. at 1010. The new site consists of a twenty-six acre tract annexed from
an unincorporated area of Cook County. The development plan provides for
commercial use of fourteen acres with the remaining twelve acres to be developed
for a four-story building and two-story attached townhouses totalling 189 units.
Id. at 1009. The original site was a fifteen-acre tract which was to be developed for
190 units consisting of twenty two-story clustered townhouses. Id.
190. Id. at 1012.
191. Id.; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
193. 616 F.2d at 1012-13.
194. Id. at 1013.
195. Id. at 1015. The court also discussed the Fair Housing Act policy favoring
settlement and the contribution toward achievement of the statutory goals by
voluntary compliance. Id. at 1014. In his dissent, Circuit Judge Pell found that the
goal behind the consent decree had been frustrated by allowing Arlington Heights
to remedy its exclusionary zoning policy by satisfying the requirement to provide
for multiple-family use in an area which is on the outskirts of the village and was
not part of the village until the consent decree was entered. Id. at 1016. The
dissent also held that the property interests of the intervenors had been violated
2. "Inclusionary Zoning"
Communities concerned with providing low- and moderate-
income housing have tried a variety of techniques over the past
twenty years to correct housing imbalances. Many such techniques
involve some compulsory quota or percentage."9 Increasingly, the
techniques involve a mandatory levy of low-income units or money
to pay for such units as a precondition for constructing a housing
development. Whether the levy is exercised at the rezoning, spe-
cial permit or building permit stage, it is usually called "inclusion-
ary zoning," as distinguished from "exclusionary zoning," though
in fact it is not zoning at all.
In 1973, inclusionary zoning suffered a setback at the judicial
level from which it has not wholly recovered, though, as will
appear below, communities are still enacting inclusionary zoning
schemes. In Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises,1" it may
be recalled, an amendment to a local zoning ordinance required a
developer of more than fifty dwelling units to build at least 15
percent suitable for low- and moderate-income families. Although
there was a bonus feature (density standards were relaxed to
permit one additional "regular" dwelling unit for each two units of
the "low-moderate" variety, but only up to a maximum of 120
percent of the normally permitted densities), the 15 percent re-
quirement was mandatory. 98 In a terse opinion, the Supreme
Court of Virginia declared the ordinance invalid on the ground
that it constituted "socioeconomic" zoning, exceeding the author-
ity of the local zoning enabling act, and amounted to a taking
without compensation.'
This decision has not deterred other jurisdictions from dealing
with the need for low- and moderate-income housing through
inclusionary techniques. Such inclusionary housing programs were
adopted in 1980 by Boulder, Colorado and Monterey County,
California.
by the closed-door rezoning of neighboring land which precluded the opportunity
to protect the value of their land.
196. See, e.g., The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control, supra note 2, at ch.
6; Franklin, Falk & Levin, In-Zoning: A Guide for Policymakers on Inclusionary
Land Use Program, in POTOMAC INSTITUTE (1974).
197. 214 Va. 246, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
198. Id. at -' 198 S.E.2d at 601-02.
199. Id. at -, 198 S.E.2d at 602. See Comment, Board of Supervisors v.
DeGroff Enterprises, Inc.: A Case of Inclusionary Zoning, 60 IOWA L. REV. 413
(1974); Baade, Required Low Income Housing in Residential Developments, 16
A~iz. L. REV. 439 (1974); Bozuug, Can an "Inclusionary" Land Use Plan
Withstand a Right to Travel Challenge?, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 623 (1976).
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Boulder Ordinance No. 44951 was enacted to halt the resale of
units constructed pursuant to Resolution 11521 and/or the growth
control ordinance in contravention of the goals of those ordi-
nances. Resolution 115 requires that 15 percent of the total units
built in new residential development on property annexed by the
city must be low- and moderate-income housing. The growth
control ordinance provides a point system to assist developers in
obtaining building permits by their agreement to provide moder-
ate-income housing. The housing thereby provided had been de-
pleted by resales at prices above low- and moderate-income levels.
The Moderate Income Sales Program is designed to maintain
future units constructed for low- and moderate-income persons
within that market for fifteen years. The developer agreement sets
forth the initial restrictions. The original sale price of such units
will be set by the City of Boulder Housing Authority (BHA), and,
if the developer is unable to sell the unit within six months, the
BHA will purchase or arrange for the purchase of the unit. The
warranty deed must contain a right of first refusal in BHA. The
purchaser must also enter into an agreement with BHA, cov-
enanting:
a. that the unit will be owner-occupied with the exception of
periods not to exceed eighteen months for which permission
is granted upon written request;
b. that the owner will give written notice to BHA of his intent to
sell, thus enabling BHA to exercise its right of first refusal;
and
c. that the owner will sell the property only to BHA or another
qualified buyer at a price no greater than the purchase price
plus the cost of major permanent inprovements and a percen-
tage increase based on the HUD median-income estimates at
the time of the resale.
The Monterey County ordinance was adopted to meet the re-
quirements of a growth management amendment to the county
general plan.2' It provides a program of resale control to ensure
the continuing availability of low- and moderate-income housing
and thereby enhances the public welfare.3
200. Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 4495 (May 6, 1980).
201. Boulder, Colo., Resolution 115 (1973).
202. The county has admittedly not completed its updating of the housing
element to the general plan. Monterey County Cal., Ordinance , § 1.1 (1980).
203. Id. §§ 1.5, 2.
756 THE URBAN LAWYER
All new residential development projects are required to con-
tribute to the provision of housing for low- and moderate-income
households. In all development projects of five or more units,
contribution must at least equal 15 percent of the total number of
units approved for the project. The requirement, however, may be
satisfied at the election of the developer:
a. by on-site construction;
b. by construction at another location within the county;
c. by transfer of title to residential lots within the project to the
housing authority;
d. by transfer of title to approved residential lots outside the
development
e. by payment of a sum of money to the housing authority in
accordance with the given formula; or
f. by any combination of the above.'
Developments of fewer units must contribute as well; however, the
percentage requirement is scaled down. The ordinance also gives
commercial and industrial developers the opportunity to partici-
pate in the plan and so derive its benefits. °5 When a developer
provides for more than the minimum number of units required, a
density bonus of one lot or unit per inclusionary unit provided is
that which shall be transferable or salable.)°
The ordinance also provides for the continuing availability of the
units by imposing restrictions on rentals and sales. The resale
provisions provide that the units must first be offered to the hous-
ing authority and then to the developer. If neither party accepts,
the unit may be sold free of the restrictions. If either the housing
authority or the developer purchases the unit, the purchase price is
based on the lesser of two amounts reached per formula.m The
availability of the units for low- and moderate-income households
expires after fifty-nine years.'
The ordinance also allows for county involvement in providing
low- and moderate-income housing by the waiver of building per-
mit fees on the inclusionary portion of the project as well as by any
of the following:
a. reduction of costs of governmental approval process;
204. Id. at § 4.3A.
205. Id. at § 4.4.
206. Id. at § 4.3D.
207. Id. at § 4.6.
208. Id. at § 4.6D.
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b. relaxation of public improvement and development stan-
dards;
c. allowance of bonus densities (one per inclusionary unit);
d. providing additional land for residential development;
e. relief from the costs of infrastructure improvements; and
f. use of publicly generated funds to reduce development
costs.,
Monterey County has provided a vast array of options to develop-
ers in order to generate incentive for participation in the program.
One of the more innovative inclusionary devices, "ohana (fam-
ily) zoning," has recently been enacted by Hawaii. Provided there
is adequate infrastructure and parking, each county is required to
permit two dwelling units in each residential zone, including the
previously sacrosanct R-1. Yard and other bulk requirements per
lot will still apply, so not all lots or all neighborhoods will have the
advantage of the new laws. It is hoped that the law will increase the
number of dwelling units, especially in the lower-price range, in a
state where, for example, the average price of a single-family home
in the Honolulu area exceeds $170,000.
3. Miscellaneous Exclusionary Devices:
New Cases
a. MINIMUM LOT REQUIREMENTS
In Martin v. Township of Millcreek,10 the Pennsylvania court
took a Solomonlike stance with respect to a ten-acre minimum lot
requirement for single-family dwellings: unduly restrictive but not
exclusionary. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the require-
ment excluded population from the township or that the township
failed to provide for acceptance of a "fair share" of any class of
housing.21" ' The court held that although the ten-acre requirement
applied to only one zone, which covered one-third of the township,
it was not justifiable, even on watershed protection grounds, and
so was unconstitutionally unreasonable."'
209. Id. at § 4.7B.
210. 50 Pa. Commw. Ct. 249, 413 A.2d 764 (1980).
211. Id. at __, 413 A.2d at 766. The township imposed the ten-acre minimum
in the "E-1 Ecologically Sensitive District" which covers one-third of the
township's area. A one-acre minimum lot size is required in other areas of the
township. Id. at __, 413 A.2d at 765.
212. Id. at -, 413 A.2d at 768. The township also attempted to justify its
ordinance through its comprehensive plan by showing the rural nature, popula-
tion stability, low growth rate and availability of growth space in the township, as
well as the one-acre minimum lot requirement in one-third to one-half of the
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On the other hand, a New York court upheld a five-acre mini-
mum lot size in Kursius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper
Brookville.113 Noting that minimum acreage requirements had
been upheld as a means of protecting open space and halting
urbanization,214 the court held the lot size ordinance by itself was
not an indicia of exclusion, did not ignore regional needs, and did
comply with comprehensive plans.215
Other recent cases deal with the exclusion of or restrictions on
the number of town houses, 16 midrise apartments,"7 housing for
the elderly1 ' and mobile home parks. 9
E. Short Takes220
Land use, planning and zoning being a fertile field, the recent
developments in the various specialized areas are each easily
worthy of treatment in a full-length article. Some of the highlights
are set out below.
1. Historic Preservation
It is hard to beat the blockbuster served up in 1978 when the
Supreme Court decided Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.22' There, the Court upheld New York City's historic
township. Id. In addition, the court noted that none of the township's evidence
related the zoning purposes to the deprivation of value inherent in the ten acre pei
dwelling requirement. Id.
213. 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980).
214. Id. at 344, 414 N.E.2d at 683, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
215. Id. at 345-46, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
216. In re Appeal of Kravitz, __ Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 419 A.2d 227 (1980(zoning ordinance effectively prohibiting townhouse use struck down).
217. Board of Supervisors v. Gentsch, 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. 455,414 A.2d 110,(1980) (ordinance upheld though mid-rise apartments permitted only as part of
planned development).
218. Apfelbaum v. Town of Clarkstown, 104 Misc. 2d 371, 428 N.Y.S.2d 38'(1980) (upheld zoning code which prohibited construction of over 106 dwellinj
units at any senior citizen housing site and prohibited senior citizen dwelling
from being constructed within 1500 feet of each other).
219. Environmental Communities of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. North Coventr
Township, 49 Pa. Commw. Ct. 167, 412 A.2d 650 (1980); In re Appeal of Hum
Village, 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. 465, 414 A.2d 768 (1980).
220. Much of this section was culled from subcommittee reports of the Corn
mittee on Land Use, Planning and Zoning submitted by the following chairmer
Christopher J. Duerksen of the Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C
(Historic Preservation); Charles J. Liberto, City Attorney, Arcadia, Californi
Aesthetics and Architectural Controls); Alan N. Jensen of Pueblo, Colorad
208 and other Federal Clean Water Act cases); John M. Armentano of Willisto
Park, New York (§ 1983 Actions and Land Use); and William K. Fahey
Lansing, Michigan (Citizen Participation in Land Use Decision Making).
221. 483 U.S. 108 (1978).
FALL 1981
LAND USE CONTROLS 759
preservation law against a challenge that the denial of a certificate
of appropriateness to construct a highrise office building atop
Grand Central Station constituted an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation. At least one of the reasons for the
decision was the provision in the ordinance permitting transfer of
development rights, thereby lost, to nearby parcels, a form of
"compensable regulation" the importance of which is considerably
increased following the San Diego Gas & Electric Co. decision
discussed earlier.
One of the recent important developments in this area is the
1980 amendment of the National Historic Preservation Act.Y
First, the amendments provide that a property may not be listed on
the National Register of Historic Places if the owner thereof
objects.m Listing is critical as in many instances it triggers delays
and places obstacles in the path of state and federal action which
would damage or destroy listed properties. Second, local govern-
ments are given significant power over registered nominations if
the local historic preservation programs meet certain minimum
standards, such as when they:
a. enforce appropriate state or local legislation for the designa-
tion and protection of historic property;
b. have established an adequate and qualified historic preserva-
tion review commission by state or local legislation;
c. maintain a system for the survey and inventory of properties;
d. provide for adequate public participation in the local historic
preservation program, including a process of recommending
property for nomination to the National Registry; and
e. satisfactorily perform the responsibility delegated to them
under the Act.'
Meeting such standards results in a certified local program which
can qualify the local government for federal funding programs.
For local governments acting to designate and preserve historic
properties pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, it is
worth noting recent decisions which have held, inter alia, that mere
designation does not usually result in a "taking" of property by
222. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470ee (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 96-515, §§ 101-507, 94 Stat. 2987.
223. Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 2988 (1980).
224. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), requires the consideration of alternatives
when a federally intitiated, licensed or funded project adversely affects a listed
property.
225. Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 2988 (1980).
regulation;' 2 that a building need not be of extraordinary signi-
ficance to be accorded protection ;"' but that delay in designation,
including a moratorium of indefinite duration for the purposes of
drafting a preservation plan, m can be fatal. 9 Moreover, restora-
tion of a landmark may be required under certain circumstances.'
In case of conflict between governmental agencies, some courts
have examined the mandate of the governmental entity to see
whether it should be subject to a historical preservation law. 1
2. Aesthetics and Architectural Controls
Besides Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego discussed above,
several other jurisdictions have dealt with aesthetics in the past
year or two. Colorado upheld on aesthetic grounds a setback
ordinance prohibiting structures less than four feet from the prop-
erty boundary. 2 Illinois shifted to the developer the burden of
proving that aesthetic regulations have no relationship to the pub-
lic health, safety or welfare?3 New Jersey found aesthetics a legiti-
mate end for municipal zoning.' In Washington, attractiveness
and beauty in the architectural scene are appropriate general
welfare concerns at the municipal level. 5 Florida found that pre-
serving the historical character of a neighborhood is a valid exer-
cise of the police power through zoning. 36
3. Clean Water Act and Land Use
A procedural matter of some importance, though not directly
related to land use, has recently been decided by the Third Circuit.
226. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va.
1980).
227. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1979), affd, 52 N.Y.2d 1031, 420 N.E.2d 102, 438 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1981).
228. Southern Nat'l Bank of Houston v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (landmark law held to impose "scenic event" thereby damaging
property in violation of the Texas Constitution's "taking" clause).
229. Life of the Land, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 592 P.2d 26 (Hawaii 1979);
Committee to Save the Fox Building v. Birmingham Branch of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 497 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
230. LaFayette Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980).
231. State of Washington v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162, 615 P.2d 461
(1980). See, e.g., Ross, Intergovernmental Zoning Disputes: A Continuing Prob-
lem, 32 LAND USE AND ZONING DIG. 6 (1980).
232. City of Leadville v. Road, 198 Colo. 328, 600 P.2d 62 (1980).
233. Ward v. County of Cook, 68 Ill. App. 3d 563, 386 N.E.2d 309 (1980).
234. State v. Miller, 174 N.J. Super. 253, 416 A.2d 81 (1980).
235. Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19,586 P.2d 860 (1978).
236. Moviematic Indust. Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 349 So. 2d 661
(Fla. 1980).
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In National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. New York,2 7 the court dis-
cussed the extent to which citizens' suits may be brought for
violations of the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs had failed to give the
required sixty-days' notice under section 505(a) of the Act.2 Not-
ing a conflict in circuits over the issue, the court found an alterna-
tive basis for the suit in section 505(e).29
The federal courts have also held that EPA Clean Water Act
regulations promulgated after a statutory deadline are probably
valid anyway and are binding upon most of the parties intended to
be regulated absent a showing of substantial prejudice or substan-
tial deviation or time between the proposal and promulgation
stages.'2
Jurisdictional conflict in the promulgation of Clean Water Act
regulations and Surface Mining and Reclamation Act regulations
was resolved in favor of the former."
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Actions in the
Area of Land Use
After Monell v. Department of Social Services,242 Owen v. City of
Independence, 3 and Maine v. Thiboutot,2" it now appears the
doors are open in both federal and state courts to actions under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act2' 5 for the review of land use
decisions made by legislative bodies if such decisions are alleged to
violate either federal Constitution or statute. It is apparently open
to a prospective plaintiff to choose either a federal or a state court
as the forum in which to file his cause of action. If the state court is
chosen, a major problem of proof can arise because issues dealing
with the claim of unconstitutionality of a legislative enactment
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a quantum of
evidence. Although there appears to be no direct appellate author-
ity on the subject in the federal system, it has been held that under
section 1983 the burden of proof is that in other civil rights action,
237. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980).
238. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
239. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976); 616 F.2d at 1227-28.
240. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1980);
Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1980).
241. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
242. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
243. 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
244. 444 U.S. 1042 (1980).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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and the fact that a zoning enactment is being tested is no reason to
increase this burden. In Omnia Properties Inc. v. Town of
Brookhaven, the federal district court for the Eastern District of
New York determined:
Defendants also urge plaintiff's burden is to establish the invalidity of the
zoning ordinance "beyond a reasonable doubt." While it is true that New
York's Court of Appeals has used that language in some cases. .. , there does
not appear to be any articulated reason why the level of proof in a zoning case
should differ from that applicable to other civil litigation. Nor does the "reason-
able doubt" standard of proof for a criminal case seem particularly appropriate
here, where the evidence is basically uncontested and the only dispute is over its
interpretation and proper application in a constitutional context. In any event,
this Court is not bound on a constitutional issue by whatever level of proof the
New York State court might choose to uphold. For purposes of this case, tried
without a jury, the Court assumes that any fact may be taken as true if it is
supported by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, a general standard
appropriate to most civil cases.24
It is suggested that this standard of proof forms a part of the
cause of action and should be binding upon the state court judge
when the proceeding is brought in the state court. There are,
however, no decisions directly on whether, assuming a lesser stan-
dard of proof, the state court, sitting in a section 1983 case, must
apply the federal standard.
5. Referendum Zoning
The use of a referendum to recall zoning amendments has been an
issue of critical importance since the Supreme Court's 1976 deci-
sion in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises.4 7 There, the Court
upheld the authority of a home-rule municipality which by charter
provided automatically for such referenda on each and every re-
zoning by the city council. The decision had interesting implica-
tions for those espousing the theory that rezonings may be quasi-
judicial if the parcel involved is small enough and the interested
parties few and localized enough. m Such rezonings would then
presumably be referendum-proof.
While at least one court held a referendum provision in a city
charter inapplicable to rezoning decisions because the applicable
zoning enabling act did not include an express authorization
246. No. 77-C-574 (E.D.N.Y., decided Dec. 26, 1979).
247. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See Bell, The Referendum Issue: Democracy's Bar-
rier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); Callies, The Supreme Court I
Wrong About Zoning by Popular Vote, 42 PLANNING 4 (Dec. 1976).
248. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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therefore," a more recent case from Michigan has upheld such a
provision." An interesting juxtaposition of charter-authorized
referendum upon petition versus vested rights is due to be decided
soon in Hawaii. There, a county charter provision specifically
protecting vested rights in the event a referendum overturns a
rezoning was held to protect a developer who continued to build a
coastal resort hotel even after petition for referendum was
accepted and the referendum was overwhelmingly passed."1
249. San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
250. Huxtable v. Meridian, __ Mich. App. -, 302 N.W.2d 282 (1981).
251. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 2388 (5th Cir. Feb.
9, 1981).

